c We study the effects of facilitation and competition on group foraging in patches. c Using the marginal value theorem, we find the optimal group size and residence time. c Trade-offs between facilitation and competition influence the optimal group size. c Groups are predicted to exploit patches differently than individual foragers. a r t i c l e i n f o 
a b s t r a c t
Significant progress has been made towards understanding the social behaviour of animal groups, but the patch model, a foundation of foraging theory, has received little attention in a social context. The effect of competition on the optimal time to leave a foraging patch was considered as early as the original formulation of the marginal value theorem, but surprisingly, the role of facilitation (where foraging in groups decreases the time to find food in patches), has not been incorporated. Here we adapt the classic patch model to consider how the trade-off between facilitation and competition influences optimal group size. Using simple assumptions about the effect of group size on the foodfinding time and the sharing of resources, we find conditions for existence of optima in patch residence time and in group size. When patches are close together (low travel times), larger group sizes are optimal. Groups are predicted to exploit patches differently than individual foragers and the degree of patch depletion at departure depends on the details of the trade-off between competition and facilitation. A variety of currencies and group-size effects are also considered and compared. Using our simple formulation, we also study the effects of social foraging on patch exploitation which to date have received little empirical study.
& 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Introduction
Understanding the economic basis of how animals should allocate time spent foraging in a patch before departing to search for new patches has been a cornerstone of foraging theory. Although the patch model has been applied to a wide variety of contexts for solitary foragers (Stephens and Krebs, 1986; Stephens et al., 2007) , the role of group foraging or the social patch model has received considerably less attention (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000) . In parallel to Charnov's (1976) Marginal Value Theorem (MVT), Parker and Stuart (1976) independently published a similar framework adapting a mating system model to a foraging system. Through this formulation, they considered competition for resources among a group of foragers in a patch. They acknowledged that in addition to this type of competition, group foraging may facilitate finding food and affect prey intake rates (e.g. producing an Allee effect). This facilitation was not, however, included in their model or other models (Yamamura and Tsuji, 1987) to date. Here we adapt the MVT idea to consider both competition and facilitation in patches by groups of foragers.
Foraging in groups brings both costs and benefits (Perrins and Birkhead, 1983; Clark and Mangel, 1986; Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Galef and Giraldeau, 2001; Krause and Ruxton, 2002) . For a variety of species, being part of a group can increase foraging success through increased searching capacity, information exchange, and capture efficiency (Sullivan, 1984; Gotmark et al., 1986; Brown and Brown, 1996; Perrins and Birkhead, 1983) . This effect, however, can depend strongly on group size, and the costs of increased competition or interference may outweigh the benefits of facilitation in larger groups. The social patch model with competition indicates that foragers should leave a patch earlier (and more thoroughly depleted) when foraging in groups than when foraging alone (Parker and Stuart, 1976; Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000) . However, the effects of facilitation could influence this result.
Here we adapt the MVT to consider costs and benefits of both competition and facilitation. We ask whether and how a trade-off between these factors influences the optimal number of individuals in a group and their patch residence-time. We restrict attention to social animals that travel and forage together, arriving and departing from a patch simultaneously. We also focus on the situation that the timescale of resource renewal is much longer than the timescale of patch exploitation. Given that time and/or energy may be the limiting factor in different circumstances (Ydenberg and Hurd, 1998) , we consider strategies that optimize either rate or efficiency currencies. We incorporate an additional factor, namely facilitation, to the theory of social foraging in patches, allowing us to consider how the trade-off between competition and facilitation influences decisions about how long to stay in a patch.
Mathematical models

Optimal foraging time for a single forager
Here we briefly summarize the classical Marginal Value Theorem (Charnov, 1976) before extending it to group foraging.
The time required to travel between food patches is denoted t.
The time spent foraging in a patch is t, and f(t) is the total energy gained by foraging in a patch for time t. We consider the rate of energy gain function as the currency of interest, defined as
Elementary calculus leads to the well-known result that optimal patch residence time t n satisfies f 0 ðt n Þ ¼ f ðt n Þ=ðt n þ tÞ, provided that f(t) is concave down. A well-known graphical solution (the rooted tangent) is often used to locate the optimal value t n on the time axis. This will be discussed further on.
While a wide variety of energy gain functions are theoretically possible (Stephens and Krebs, 1986) , we consider a classic case of diminishing returns. We model diminishing returns using the following saturating function:
Eq. (2) describes the energy gain of an individual. This function levels off to a constant, E max , the maximal energy level that can be extracted from a patch by an individual foraging for a long time.
(Alternately, this parameter represents the maximal attainable per-forager resource quantity in some other currency, such as number of prey items.) The parameter t f is a typical time scale for a single forager to find resources. In fact, for the specific choice of (2), t f is the time at which the forager finds half of the resources they could maximally attain (t ¼ t f implies f ¼ E max =2). Small t f implies rapid success finding food in the patch, and a correspondingly steep initial increase of the function f. For a single individual, with energy gain f(t) given by Eq. (2), it can be shown by optimizing R with respect to t that the optimal patch residence time t n is t n ¼ ffiffiffiffiffiffi ffi
Thus, the optimal time is independent of E max . Moreover, it increases with t f and with t.
Effect of group size
We now generalize the model to account for group foraging. First note that the social version of Eq. (1) would take the form:
where, to avoid confusion, we use ''hats'' here and later to indicate functions analogous to R(t) and f(t) that depend on both foraging time and group size.f ðN,tÞ is the total energy gain by each individual when foraging in a group with N additional members (group size N þ1) for time t. Optimizing the behaviour now corresponds to maximizingR with respect to both N and t, which requires finding t n and N n satisfying both
As bothR andf are taken to be smooth functions of N and t, the order of differentiation to identify the t and/or N coordinate of the critical point is immaterial. For example, we may first consider N constant and compute the optimal timet n ðNÞ (which leads to an expression analogous to Eq. (3) that depends on N) and then solve for N n by setting @R=@NðN,t n Þ ¼ 0. We carry out this procedure for different assumptions about the N dependence, below. In addition, we also verified that we obtain local maxima, rather than other types of critical points analytically (by computing second derivatives) and/or graphically.
We now defineÊ max ðNÞ andt f ðNÞ as, respectively, the perindividual resource available, and the food-finding time when an individual forages in a group with N additional members (group size of N þ 1). Then
For a fixed group size (N is constant), the optimal time is obtainable simply by carrying out the previous single-variable procedure, leading to
which is, as before, independent ofÊ max ðNÞ. In order to consider the effects of group size, we take the following considerations in choosing appropriate functions forÊ max ðNÞ and t f ðNÞ. As N increases, competition between group members should lower per-individual resource availability, and facilitation should lower the time to find the food. Hence, bothÊ max ðNÞ andt f ðNÞ should be functions that decrease with N. Here we study two variants of the model, one in which group members interfere (preventing each other from obtaining the available resources effectively), and another in which they always share the resources equally.
Interference at large group size
We first considered a case where competition and interference in large groups cause additional depletion and division of resources, making less and less energy available per individual. If prey sense a larger group of predators more easily than a smaller group, they may escape from the patch with higher probability. This could lead to a depletion/interference effect that increases with group size. We thus assume thatÊ max ðNÞ andt f ðNÞ depend exponentially on N, i.e.
The variable N represents the number of additional individuals in a foraging group, so the limit N¼ 0 is the single forager case. As N gets large, bothÊ max ðNÞ andt f ðNÞ tend to zero faster than 1=N. There is less energy available than would be the case with equal subdivision (considered in the next case). The parameters N c and N f correspond to group sizes. If an individual forages in a group with an additional N c members, the resource available to it drops to 37% of what it can gain in solitary foraging, because it has to compete with group members (i.e.Ê max ðN c Þ ¼ E max Á ð1=eÞ % 0:37E max ). Similarly, when foraging with N f other individuals, the food-finding time would drop to 0:37t f . It is convenient to refer to N c as the competition group-size and to N f as the facilitation group-size. If N c (or N f ) is large, it takes a large group to lead to significant competition (or facilitation).
Equal sharing
We also considered the case where patch resource is constant (e.g. sessile prey items) and split equally between group members. In that case, we considered rational functions of the form:
where m is a positive constant. Here we use N þ1 (rather than just N) to maintain the N ¼0 limit as the single forager case. The expression forẼ max ðNÞ is the per-individual share in a group of size N þ 1, and is intuitively clear. For example, in a group of size 2 (N ¼1) each gets an equal share of ð1=2ÞE max . The parameter m has the following meaning: in a group of size 2, the food-finding time changes from t f to ½ð1=2Þ m t f . If m¼1, the competition and facilitation change at the same pace with increasing N. When m 41, there is a sharper drop in food-finding time (more facilitation), whereas when 0 o m o1, there is a sharper drop in the resource per individual as N increases (more competition).
Energy gain function for an individual foraging in a group
We first considered the interference case, adopting Eq. (7). We rescale population size by the competition group-size, defining N ¼ N=N c . We also define the dimensionless ratio:
The parameter a, which is positive, is the ratio of the facilitation and competition group sizes. Then a 5 1 means N f 5N c which implies thatt f ðNÞ decreases (exponentially) at a faster rate thanÊ max ðNÞ as group size N increases; this reflects the case when facilitation outweighs competition in social foraging. The regime a b 1, conversely, means N f b N c , soÊ max ðNÞ drops faster thant f ðNÞ as N increases; this corresponds to the case when competition dominates over facilitation in social foraging. We refer to a as the competitionfacilitation parameter for brevity, and we note that a plays a role analogous to 1=m in Eq. (8). We will be interested in both the high facilitation limit a-0 and high competition limit a-1.
After scaling, we can rewrite Eq. (7) in terms of the nondimesionalized group size,
We denote f ðN,tÞ as the per-individual energy gain function in the rescaled variable, f ðN,tÞ f ðN,tÞ ¼f ðN Á N c ,tÞ
From now on, we drop the bars from N and f and simply denote the rescaled population size as N and the function of interest in (10) as f.
For the purpose of optimization, the constant factor of E max multiplying (10) is immaterial, and will be henceforth set to 1.
Results
3.1.
Optimizing the rate of energy gain for group foraging 3.1.1. Interference at large group size Using the rate of energy gain, Eq. (4) as the currency to be maximized, and the (rescaled) version of the function f ðN,tÞ given by (10) (with bars removed), we look for values t n and N n that maximize RðN,tÞ with respect to both t and N. Following rescaling, the optimal patch residence time, as given in Eq. (6), can be written as
Note that as N-0, this coincides with the classical result (3) for a single forager. Solving for the optimal group size (@R=@N ¼ 0) at the optimal foraging time t n ðNÞ leads to the critical point:
From Eq. (12) we cannot have a¼1 as it leads to singularity. The critical points that could give an optimal time t n for the optimal group size N n are given by
Then for feasible optimal residence time t n 4 0, either a 4 1 and t n ¼ ta=ðaÀ1Þ, or a o 1 and t n ¼ ta=ð1ÀaÞ.
To check which of these cases corresponds to a local maximum we consider both a (generalized) ''second derivative test'' and graphical evidence. First, in Fig. 1 , we show the contour plot of RðN,tÞ for different values of the competition-facilitation parameter, a. To check if group foraging is in fact optimal compared to solitary foraging, we looked for regions where RðN,tÞ is larger than the optimal solitary value Rð0,t n ð0ÞÞ; these are shaded in grey in Fig. 1 . Within this region, any combination of patch residence time t and group size N would lead to a larger rate of energy gain than when foraging alone (at optimal condition). The maximum point of RðN,tÞ is located within this region. We observed that when a is not too large (a¼0.3 and 0.5 in Fig. 1 ), there exists a range of N and t (that is positive and biologically relevant), where RðN,tÞ is larger that the corresponding value when foraging alone. We verified this further analytically by inspecting the Hessian matrix consisting of all the second partial derivatives: 
For an optimal group size and patch residence time, we need both R tt ðN,tÞ o0 and detðHÞ 40. Second, we also plot the rate of energy gain RðN,tÞ, as in Fig. 1 . a 41 case: We found that while R tt o 0, detðHÞ o 0 only when 1 o a t 1:11. Thus for a wide range of parameter value, this case will not lead to RðN,tÞ having a local maximum at N n and t n . Moreover, in the narrow range 1 o a t1:11, we found that N n o0, as shown in Fig. 1(d) . Thus, this case is not biologically relevant. We conclude that when a 4 1, no relevant optimal group size N n exists. This result is intuitively reasonable: when competition is stronger than facilitation, a forager does best on its own, rather than in a group. a o1 case: This case always results in a local maximum since we found that detðHÞ 40 and R tt o0. An optimum can be seen at a positive N n value in Fig. 1(a) and (b). Thus, we conclude that to obtain a biologically relevant optimum, we need at least 0 o a o 1, i.e. an optimal group size exists only when N f o N c (high facilitation case). By graphing, we also further observe that a biologically relevant value N n 4 0 is obtained when a is below a certain critical value that is less than one. One particular example with a ¼0.8 is shown in Fig. 1(c) , where the maximum of Rðn,tÞ occurs at a negative N n value.
We conclude that the optimal group size N n is given by Eq. (12) provided 0 o a o 1. The dependence of the optimal group size N n on the competition-facilitation parameter a is non-monotonic as shown in Fig. 2(a) . In the high facilitation regime (a-0), very small group sizes are optimal. Here, the addition of very few individuals to the group sharply reduces the time to obtain food, i.e.t f ðNÞ drops steeply with increasing N. In this regime, the best strategy is to maintain a small group size where the disadvantage of competition is avoided while the benefits of facilitation are already significant. As a is increased, the optimal group size also increases. In this regime it takes a larger group to reap the benefits of facilitation. The time to obtain foodt f ðNÞ only decreases considerably when group size is increased significantly so tradeoff between facilitation and competition leads to higher optimal group size. However, when a is increased further, the disadvantage due to competition starts to outweigh facilitation so that smaller group sizes are once again optimal.
Eq. (12) also implies that N n increases with the individual food-finding time, t f , and decreases with travel time t. Thus, larger t (t f ) favors smaller (larger) groups. Specifically, N n has an explicit dependent on t f =t, the ratio of the individual foraging time to the travel time. In Fig. 2(a) , we plotted N n as a function of a for several values of the ratio t f =t. When the ratio t f =t is larger, the optimal group size N n increases. Given a value of t f =t, there exists a certain critical value of a above which N n o 0. Here the effects of competition completely exceed any benefit from facilitation and the optimal strategy would be to forage alone. Larger value of t f =t leads to a higher critical value a. Thus, decreasing t f =t leads to a narrower range of values of a which yield N n 4 0. In Fig. 3(a) , we plotted the energy gain, f ðN,tÞ, as a function of t for several values of N, including the optimal value N ¼ N n , and twice and half that value. For each of these, we draw Charnov's classical ''rooted tangent'' diagram (dashed lines emanating from t ¼ Àt and tangent to the curve), to indicate how the optimal time differs from case to case. (For example, t 2 is optimal for the case N ¼ N n , t 1 is optimal for N ¼ 2N n , and t 3 for N ¼ N n =2.) From this graph, it is seen that for optimal group size N n , the rooted tangent line has the steepest slope. We found that increasing N also increases the initial slope of the function f (with respect to t) close to t ¼0, leading to smaller optimal time t n . In Fig. 3(b) we plotted the optimal times t 1 ,t 2 ,t 3 against the respective group sizes to further emphasize the connection between optimal group size and optimal time spent in a patch.
Equal sharing
We asked how results change in the case of equal subdivision, withẼ max ðNÞ andt f ðNÞ defined in Eq. (8). As before, we set E max ¼ 1 and after similar calculation, we obtain the optimal group size:
Here, the parameter m plays a role analogous to the reciprocal of the facilitation-competition parameter, 1=a, in the interference case. Eq. (15) is a local maximum when m 4 1. Results are entirely analogous to the previous case, with the replacement a-1=m, and attest to the robustness of conclusions which are relatively independent of the choice of function to represent the effect of the group. In Fig. 2(b) , we plotted the optimal group size N n as a function of m for several values of the ratio t f =t. Here the high facilitation limit occurs for large m (analogous to small a) and favors small group sizes as before. ¼0) is optimal. Within the grey shaded region RðN,tÞ is larger than Rð0,t n ð0ÞÞ, the value obtained at the optimal condition when foraging alone.
observed than in the interference case (same parameter values describing solitary forager N¼ 0 are used in Fig. 2 (a) and (b)) since here foraging in a large group is not as unfavorable as in the interference case. Finally, we also note that N n has the same explicit dependence on the ratio t f =t and changing this ratio has similar effects as before, namely increasing this ratio (either by increasing the travel time t or decreasing the individual foodfinding time t f ) leads to an increase in the optimal group size.
Deviation from optimal group size
We asked to what extent deviations in group size can affect the rate of energy gain. This question is related to the steepness of the functionRðN,t n Þ when N is varied about its optimal value N n . Results for the case of interference in large groups are summarized in Fig. 4(a) -(c) for small and larger values of the parameters t, t f , and a. As seen in the figure, smaller values of the parameters (solid curves) produce relatively sharp optima in R, meaning that deviations in group size about the optimum N n sharply reduce the effectiveness of the group. For larger values (dashed curves), the peak is shallower. This is particularly true of the larger a value (lowest curve in Fig. 4(c) ), i.e. when N c % N f so that competition and facilitation effects are more closely balanced. Thus, while deviations from the optimal group size can lead to penalty in the overall rate of energy gain, the extent to which this happens depends on a combination of factors, including the travel time, resource availability, and competition-facilitation ratio.
Alternate foraging strategies and currencies for groups
The fitness currency relevant to a forager depends on whether time or energy is limiting (Ydenberg and Hurd, 1998) . We therefore considered both rate and efficiency maximization. We asked whether and how foraging strategies with other currencies would affect our conclusions, by considering three other currencies: net rate of energy gain, efficiency, and net energy gain. We applied the same analysis to each currency (calculations not shown) but limit the results to be presented for the interference case (E max ðNÞ and t f ðNÞ given by Eq. (9)). The per-individual energy gain f ðN,tÞ used here follows the scaled Eq. (10).
Rate of net energy gain
Rate maximizing is important when time is limiting (Ydenberg and Hurd, 1998; Evans, 1976; Pyke, 1980) . We thus consider the net rate of energy gain, defined as
where p 1 and p 2 represent the energetic cost of foraging and travelling, respectively. If the costs of travelling and foraging are equal (p ¼ p 1 ¼ p 2 ), maximizing the rate of net energy gain (given by Eq. (16)) reduces to maximizing ) shows the rooted tangent solution displaying the optimal foraging time t n for the optimal group size N n , and for other group sizes, 2N n and N n =2. As N increases, the slope of f ðN,tÞ (with respect to t) becomes steeper leading to smaller optimal time. (b) shows the optimal foraging time t n decreases as group size N increases. Here, t 1 is the optimal foraging time for a group of size 2N n , t 2 is the optimal foraging time for the optimal group size N n , and t 3 is the optimal foraging time for a group of size N n =2.
Since the rate of net energy gain is simply the rate of energy gain minus some constant, the optimal foraging time and optimal group size will be unchanged from Eqs. (11) and (12). When p 1 ap 2 , the maximum point cannot be expressed explicitly as it follows a transcendental equation. In Fig. 5 , we plotted the function Q ðN,t n ðNÞÞ using different values of a, p 1 and p 2 . Similar to the result obtained while maximizing RðN,tÞ, we find that group foraging is optimal (N n 40) when the facilitation competition parameter a is small as shown in Fig. 5(a) . In Fig. 5(b) and (c), we showed that increasing p 1 and p 2 reduces Q ðN,tÞ and positive optimal foraging time t n and optimal group size N n are only found when the foraging and traveling costs p 1 and p 2 are not too large. When the costs are too high, no maximum point exists (e.g. in Fig. 5(b) for p 1 ¼0.4, t n ðNÞ is complex for small N values) and thus it is optimal to forage alone.
Foraging efficiency
In some situations, foragers may maximize foraging efficiency rather than the rate of energy gain (Schmid-Hempel et al., 1985; Ydenberg and Hurd, 1998) . We define the foraging efficiency as the ratio of energy gained to energy spent, i.e.
EðN,tÞ
In the equal cost scenario as above, (
so the efficiency is simply a scalar multiple of the rate of energy gain. This means that extrema previously calculated in Eqs. (11) and (12) are unchanged. Larger costs (higher values of p) only lead to lower efficiency value.
In the p 1 a p 2 scenario, when travel and foraging costs differ, we find that t n and N n depend on the ratio p 2 =p 1 as follows:
In particular, if travel cost exceeds foraging cost (p 2 4 p 1 ), the optimal patch residence time is larger than in previous calculations. In the opposite case (p 2 o p 1 ), a larger optimal group size is favoured. This is biologically reasonable. When it is costly to reach a patch (large p 1 ), it pays to stay longer in that patch. If prey is cryptic, or hard to detect in the patch, i.e. foraging is costly (large p 2 ), a larger group size is beneficial to facilitate prey capture.
Net energy gain
Yet another currency that has been considered is the net energy gain (Van Gils et al., 2003; Hainsworth and Hamill, 1993) . The currency of net energy gain is the total energy gained minus the energy spent during foraging and travel, i.e.
GðN,tÞ
Since p 2 and t are constants, neither affect optima, and without loss of generality we can set p 2 t ¼ 0 for the optimization step. The optimal patch residence time is then For t n 40, we need p 1 t f ðNÞ o E max ðNÞ. That is, the total cost associated with foraging should be less than the maximum possible energy that can be obtained. Maximizing with respect to group size leads to two critical points, only one of which, is a local maximum:
As shown in Fig. 6(a) , the optimal group size increases as the ratio a ¼ N f =N c approaches its limiting value of 1. Using 0 o a o 1, we see that N n increases with t f and p 1 . If t f is small, food is quickly found, thus there is little point in foraging in a group to further decrease the foraging time. However, if t f is large, foraging in a group decreases the amount of time taken to find the food (facilitation) and is beneficial. Fig. 6(b) shows how N n increases with t f . Varying t f has the same effect as varying p 1 . As p 1 increases, it becomes more costly to forage; in order to maximize the energy gained, more individuals are needed for optimal group foraging, as shown in Fig. 6(b) .
Currency comparisons
Overall, we find that in the scenario of equal costs (p 1 ¼ p 2 ), optima for group foraging based on other currencies are the same as those for the rate of energy gain discussed in Section 3.1. When travel time and/or cost is high, it is beneficial for animals to stay longer in a patch, and forage in smaller groups (as travel time or cost increases, t n increases and N n decreases). Meanwhile, for patches with small associated travel times, larger group sizes are optimal. Distinct currencies lead to different predictions mainly in the case of unequal costs of travel and foraging, p 1 a p 2 .
Patch utilization
Up to now, we have considered how group foraging affects the foraging success of individuals. We now ask a distinct but related question of how individuals versus groups affect patch depletion. One immediate question is to what extent would resources be more thoroughly depleted by a group of foragers compared to a single individual. How do facilitation and competition affect the level of depletion? We calculate resources remaining after a group of size N foragers leaves the patch at the optimal foraging time t n ðNÞ:
where E tot is the maximum energy that can be extracted from the patch. For simplicity, here we consider the case where E tot ¼ E max , i.e. a single forager can extract all resources available given enough time. As before, we take the total resources in a patch to be E max ¼ 1 (see scaling in Eq. (10)). ðN þ 1Þf ðN,t n ðNÞÞ gives the total resources obtained by the group after foraging for time t n (we use the factor N þ1 since the single forager limit is given by N¼0).
In Fig. 7 , we show the effects of facilitation and competition on patch utilization by plotting fðN n Þ as the facilitation-competition parameter is varied for both the interference case (Eq. (7)) and the equal sharing case (Eq. (8) (23) on parameter values; (a) the competition-facilitation parameter, a; (b) the individual foraging time, t f or p 1 (varying t f or p 1 has the same effect). Default values: a¼ 0.6, t f ¼ 10, and p 1 ¼ 10 (unless being used as the free variable). In (a), we see that N n increases sharply as a approaches 1. In (b), we see that N n increases sharply for small values of t f and p 1 , but increases less drastically for larger values. (N n 4 0), group foraging leads to a greater patch exploitation compared to foraging alone. When a is small, facilitation is high. While the optimal group size is small, the group is able to extract resources to the fullest extent. At higher values of a however, with less facilitation, the group does not forage as effectively, leading to higher level of resources remaining (larger f). For the equal sharing case, we also see a similar effect in that facilitation (high value of m) leads to more effective foraging and fewer resources remaining when the group leaves the patch. Note that for both cases, high levels of patch utilization (lower f) are obtained when facilitation is highest even though the optimal group size may not be largest at the high facilitation limit.
The dependence of patch depletion on group size is shown further in Fig. 8 . For the interference case, a small group can extract more resource than a solitary forager. With increasing facilitation (increasing the parameter a), the amount of resources extracted increases with group size. However, large group size leads to less efficient foraging due to interference. Far from the optimum, at high group size N, the resource extracted by the entire group is actually lower than that extracted by one solitary forager. This is not observed when group members share resources equally (''equal sharing'' case). Here increasing the group size will eventually lead to a complete depletion of resources (f-0).
Discussion
Many influences contribute to collective animal behaviour, including foraging in groups (see, for example, Chapter 2 in the recent survey by Sumpter, 2010 ). Here we were particularly concerned with costs and benefits of group foraging. Using the classic marginal value theorem (MVT) and a simple saturating function for energy gain over time spent foraging in a patch we explored how the trade-off between facilitation and competition changes with group size, influencing the economics of foraging decisions in patches with diminishing returns. Compared to the solitary (classical) patch model, group foraging has an evolutionary advantage if the benefits of finding food more quickly through social facilitation outweighs the costs of competition, or sharing food with other group members. Our model allows this trade-off to be explicitly considered in an elementary mathematical setting.
Both the optimal patch residence time t n and optimal group size N n depend on the parameters such as t, the travel time, t f the individual foraging time, and the balance of competition and facilitation, represented by the ratio a ¼ N f =N c in the interference case, or parameter m % 1=a under the equal sharing assumption. Thus, the relative strengths of competition and facilitation influence the result of this trade-off. The optimal patch residence time increases as the travel time and the time required to find food increase. When the travel time is small, large group sizes are optimal. If t f is large (i.e. if the time needed by an individual to find food is large), larger group sizes are optimal. The parameter a (interference case) or m (equal sharing) measures the relative competition and facilitation balance. For optimal group foraging (N n 40Þ, we found the necessary condition of 0 oa o1 or m 4 1. We found that the largest optimal group size occurs at an intermediate value of the parameter a or m, i.e. where there is a balance between competition and facilitation.
We also considered the strength of selection towards optimal group size by considering the degree to which group sizes slightly bigger or smaller than the optimal group size affect the groups foraging effectiveness. If a or t are small, optimal group sizes produce the best rate of energy gain, while deviation from optimal group size produce considerably lower rates of energy gain. In these cases, there will be strong selection for optimal group size. In other situations however, the deviation from optimal group size will be less significant, suggesting weaker selection towards a specific optimal group size.
Our model does not include the dynamics of group formation for loose social structures where individuals can join or leave the group. This subject forms an interesting and well-studied topic of research. For example, Sibly (1983) first proposed that optimal group size is unstable as an individual can increase its fitness by joining a group of optimal size, thus increasing the group size. Further studies such as Mangel (1984, 1986) , Pulliam and Caraco (1984) , Giraldeau and Caraco (2000) , Giraldeau and Gillis (1985) , and Higashi and Yamamura (1993) deal with such issues. Here we consider that while interference and competitions influence groups size, groups arrive and depart at the same time from patches.
In their original model of patch competition, Parker and Stuart (1976) noted that patch departure rules could depend on the decisions of others (see also Goubault et al., 2005) , and might therefore be best considered as a war of attrition (Maynard Smith, 1974) . Sjerps and Haccou (1994) conducted a formal game theoretical analysis of this competitive scenario finding that interference can have an important influence on the evolutionarily stable patch departure rules. We assumed that the group acts as a social unit, with all individuals arriving and departing simultaneously in a patch (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000) . Future work could consider variations of this approach, incorporating the role of facilitation to understand how departure rules change when individuals do not arrive simultaneously (e.g. in producerscrounger dynamics, Beauchamp and Giraldeau, 1997) or when they differ in their competitive abilities.
Previous versions of the social patch model, considering only competition, predict that foragers should stay for a shorter Fig. 8 . Resources left after a group of size N forages at its optimal time t n ðNÞ as defined in Eq. (24) with (a) interference assumption and (b) equal sharing assumption (t f ¼ 10 and t ¼ 1 in both cases, and competition-facilitation parameters a and m are varied). marks the optimal group size location. duration and that patches should be depleted to a greater level by groups than by solitary individuals (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000; Parker and Stuart, 1976) . Our results considering the trade-off between competition and facilitation similarly indicate that groups of an optimal size will often deplete more of the patch resources than solitary foragers; however, the degree of competition vs. facilitation (parameter a in the interference case, or m in the equal sharing case) determines to what extent group vs. individual patch exploitations differ. A major application of foraging theory has been in the context of ''giving up densities'' (density of resources at which individuals leave a patch) for assessing habitat quality (e.g. Brown, 1988; Valone and Brown, 1989) . The difference in how extensively groups exploit a patch compared to a solitary forager can have important implications for analyzing giving up densities in the field (Livoreil and Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000) , highlighting the importance of empirical tests of the social patch model. The role of facilitation could further complicate these interpretations of field data. Our results indicate that facilitation will also be an important consideration in interpreting giving up densities in the field, with the details of the trade-off between competition and facilitation determining the extent of patch depletion. Empirical studies of the social patch model are surprisingly lacking (Giraldeau and Caraco, 2000) and the role of facilitation has received practically no attention in this context. Our model makes a contribution to social foraging theory by providing a starting point for understanding the trade-off between facilitation and competition (Nilsson et al., 2007) . Understanding these tradeoffs during social interactions is important in shaping the functional responses of organisms and provides a mechanistic link between individual behaviour, group dynamics and community ecology.
